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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION
To RECOGNIZE AND ALLOW THE CLAIM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS
BINDING UPON THE COURTS AND Is NOT SUBJECT To REVIEW UNDER
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT.
As a result of events surrounding the recent coup d'etat in Chile, plaintiffs'
brought an action in the District Court for the Canal Zone for breach of
contract2 and conversion3 against defendant Empresa Navegacion Mambisa,4
a Cuban corporation. On October 2, 1973, the district court issued a writ
attaching a Cuban vessel.' The Czechoslovak Ambassador, representing the
interests of Cuba in the United States, requested the State Department to file
a suggestion of immunity in the district court urging the immediate release of
the vessel and dismissal of the action. Following established procedures6 the
State Department recognized and allowed the request for immunity,7 and a
suggestion of immunity was certified to the court.' In compliance with the
'Plaintiffs were Industria Azucarera Nacional, S.A., and Compania de Refineria de Azucar de
Vina del Mar, both Chilean Corporations.
'The breach of contract action arose from the failure of the M/V Playa Larga, owned by
defendant, to completely unload its sugar cargo in Valparaiso, Chile on September 11. According
to defendant, extreme danger caused the vessel to leave hurriedly. After leaving Chilean waters,
the Playa Larga was strafed by Chilean Air Force planes and shelled by a Chilean destroyer. A
second vessel, the M/V Marble Island, abandoned its voyage to Chile on September 12. Plaintiff
Industria Azucarera Nacional, S.A. sued for breach of contract, claiming full payment for the
sugar.
'The conversion action arose from the sudden departure of the Playa Larga from Valparaiso.
It carried off four unloading cranes owned by plaintiff Compania de Refineria de Azucar de Vina
del Mar. Plaintiffs' claims totaled more than $4 million.
'Empresa Navegacion Mambisa owned both vessels.
'The ship attached was the M/V Imias, also owned by the defendant.
6The hearing was before members of the Legal Advisor's Office. No presentation of testimony
or evidence was permitted and no transcript was made at this hearing. See 64 AM. J. INT'L. L.
650 (1970).
7n a memorandum to the Attorney General of the United States, the Legal Advisor said in part:
The Department recognizes and allows immunity of the M/V Imias from the jurisdic-
tion of United States courts for the purpose of arrest, attachment, suit, or any other
legal process in the above captioned action. The Department would be grateful to you
if you would cause an appropriate suggestion of immunity to be filed with the United
States District Court for the Canal Zone.
'The suggestion of immunity stated, in part:
[The issue of immunity] arises in connection with a determination reached by the
Executive Branch of the Government of the United States in the implementation of its
foreign policy and in the conduct of its international relations, which determination
should be given effect by this Court.
Plaintiffs' request for an appeal to the Secretary of State from this decision was denied. In
stating why the appeal was denied, the Legal Advisor said:
The Department's practice in sovereign immunity cases does not provide for an appeal,
or any presentation by counsel, to the Secretary of State. The Department's decision
has been taken, and, it is the Department's view that the public interest and United
States foreign relations are best served by the prompt release of the vessel.
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suggestion the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss but stayed
the order pending appeal.' Defendant petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals for writ of mandamus and prohibition, seeking the dismissal of the
action and the release of the vessel. Held, petition for writs of mandamus and
prohibition granted. The State Department's decision to recognize and allow
the claim of foreign sovereign immunity is binding on the courts, and no further
review of that decision is dictated by the Administrative Procedure Act. Spacil
v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
The doctrine that a foreign sovereign cannot be sued in the courts of the
United States without its consent was firmly anchored in American jurisprud-
ence by Chief Justice Marshall's landmark decision in The Schooner Exchange
v. M'Fadden.0 While this entrenched tenet has usually been justified on the
basis of international comity or derived by implication "from standards of
public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the 'power
and dignity' of the foreign sovereign,"" the foundation, as Justice Frankfurter
pointed out in National City Bank v. Republic of China, is not an explicit
constitutional provision; rather, it "rests on considerations of policy given legal
sanction"' 3 by the Supreme Court.
The primary consideration of policy given legal sanction by the Court has
been the avoidance of embarassment to the executive branch in its conduct of
foreign affairs by a court's exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign vessel. 4 In
Ex parte Peru15 the Supreme Court held that the State Department's decision
to recognize immunity was a "conclusive determination" of that question" and
thus foreclosing any further judicial discussion of this issue. 7 While in
'The district judge stated orally in court that he would defer the entry of the order for three days,
and if the Plaintiffs posted a $25,000 bond, the court would stay the effectiveness of the order
pending appeal.
"1 I U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116 (1812). Marshall concluded:
[T]he Exchange being a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign, with
whom the government of the United States is at peace, . . .must be considered as
having come into the American territory under an implied promise that, while necessar-
ily within it, . . . she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country ....
[T]here seems to be a necessity for admitting that the fact [of immunity] might be
disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the Attorney for the United States.
Id. at 147.
"National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955).
.2348 U.S. 356 (1955).
31d. at 359.
"Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); accord, Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578,
588 (1943). In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), the Court said, "In [cases involving
jurisdiction over foreign ships] the judicial department of this government follows the action of
the political branch, and will not embarass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."
Id. at 209.
318 U.S. 578 (1943).
"Id. at 589.
"'lsbrandsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971); Flota
Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. M/V Ciudad, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964): Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961). See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, s the Court by
way of dictum said that "[i]f the claim [of sovereign immunity] is recognized
and allowed by the executive branch of the government, it is then the duty of
the courts to release the vessel upon appropriate suggestion .... ""
Justification for judicial acquiescence has been founded on the constitutional
principle of separation of power, the executive's need for secrecy in handling
foreign affairs, and the "sovereign immunity" of the executive branch itself.
The Court in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.2" recognized as a settled principle
of law that questions arising out of the conduct of foreign relations are political
in nature and could not be resolved by the judicial branch of government."'
Using a separation of power analysis in Chicago & Southern Air Lines Inc. v.
Waterman Steamship Corp.," the Court held that " . . . final orders [which]
embody Presidential discretion as to political matters [are] beyond the compe-
tence of the courts to adjudicate.22 Although the Court in Baker v. Carr24
rejected the view that every question touching upon foreign relations is neces-
sarily a political question, 5 the criteria 21 used by the Court to define "political
"303 U.S. 68 (1938).
'l1d. at 74. If the State Department is silent on the issue of sovereign immunity, a court can
resolve that question "in conformity to the principles accepted by the department of the govern-
ment charged with the conduct of our foreign relations." Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35
(1945). The failure or refusal of the executive branch to suggest immunity has been viewed as
significant in the Court's refusal to recognize any claim of immunity; e.g., National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945); Victory
Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1964) ("[C]ourts should deny immunity where the State Department has indicated, either directly
or indirectly, that immunity need not be accorded. It makes no sense for the courts to deny a
litigant his day in court and to permit the disregard of legal obligation to avoid embarrassing the
State Department if that agency indicates it will not be embarrassed." Id. at 358. Contra, Berrizi
Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (the Court recognized the immunity of a merchant
vessel owned by the Italian government, despite the State Department's refusal to recognize such
immunity.)
2"246 U.S. 297 (1918).
"Id. at 302. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35 (1818); Foster v.
Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307, 309 (1829); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415,
420 (1839).
27333 U.S. 103 (1948) [hereinafter Chicago & Southern Air Lines].
'
3ld. at 114. The Court also said:
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions
as to foreign policy is political, not judicial . . . . They are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy . . . . They are decisions of a kind for which the
judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility ....
33 U.S. at I ll.
2369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2ld. at 211.
2339 U.S. at 217. These criteria are:
(I) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department;
(2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the ques-
[Vol. 4:2
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questions" recognized that courts should not second-guess the executive.27
The executive branch has always felt that a certain amount of secrecy was
necessary in the conduct of foreign affairs.2" Concerning the approval of an
overseas air route by the President, the Supreme Court in Chicago & Southern
Air Lines2" declared: "It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant
information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken
on information properly held secret." 0 The expansive dicta3' in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.2 is an indication of the Court's almost
unquestioned acceptance of the need for secrecy in the conduct of foreign
relations.
The third justification for judicial acquiescence often used by the courts is
the "sovereign immunity" of the executive branch itself. Nineteenth century
courts refused to review any executive action which involved an exercise of
discretion." The Court in Decatur v. Paulding34 was of the belief that "[t]he
interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the
executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of the kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
(4) the impossibility of the court acting without showing a lack of respect due coordi-
nate branches of government;
(5) an unusual need for adherence to a political decision already made;
(6) the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
"The Court said, "The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of power." 369 U.S. at 210. Using the criteria listed supra, note 26, a suggestion of
immunity by the State Department would clearly fall into the political question category.
2
"President Washington, in a statement often quoted by the courts, said in reply to a request by
the House of Representatives to see the instructions, correspondence, and documents relating to
the negotiation of the Jay Treaty:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend
on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures,
demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would
be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations,
or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
powers.
I Messages and Papers of the Presidents 194 (1897).
:9333 U.S. 103 (1948).
"Id. at Il l. The Court has apparently assumed that information concerning the conduct of
foreign affairs comes within the common law governmental privilege which has been found to exist
with respect to state secrets. This privilege is beyond the scope of this note.
"'United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319-322 (1936).
'2299 U.S. 304 (1936).
3 Brashear v. Mason, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 92, 102 (1848); United States ex rel. Tucker v. Seamar,
58 U.S., (17 How.) 225, 230 (1855). The distinction between mere ministerial acts, for which a
writ of mandamus would issue, and executive functions determined whether a court could review
actions by the executive branch. United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthris, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284,
304 (1855). Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 158 (1803).
'39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
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mischief."", But beginning with American School of Magnetic Healing v.
McAnnulty36 the nineteenth century presumption of unreviewability became
a presumption of reviewability.3 1 With the passage of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act3s in 1946, an agency action was made reviewable 39 "except to the
extent that-(a) statutes preclude judicial review, or (b) agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law." 4 In Heikkila v. Barber,4 the Court said
in dicta that "the broadly remedial purposes of the Act counsel a judicial
attitude of hospitality towards the claim that [the APA] greatly expanded the
availability of judicial review." 2 And in Brownell v. We Shung"3 it was said
that "[u]nless made by clear language or supersedure the expanded mode of
review granted by [the APA] cannot be modified."" However, the APA re-
stricts this judicial review to questions of agency authority (constitutional and
statutory), abuse of discretion, reasonable evaluation of the evidence, and pro-
per procedure. The Supreme Court in Accardi v. Shaughnessy stated that it
was not reviewing and reversing the manner in which the Immigration Board's
discretion was exercised, but rather the Court objected "to the Board's alleged
failure to exercise its own discretion, contrary to existing valid regulations. '"47
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Spacil v. Crowe4 was faced with the
novel contention that under the APA the State Department's decision to recog-
nize and allow immunity was subject to judicial review. The court stated the
issue as "whether the presumption of review accorded most agency action
obtains.1 49 Their response was that separation of powers principles and the
need for secrecy justified the continued adherence to the well-established doc-
.'Id. at 516.
36187 U.S. 94 (1902).
31For pre-A.P.A. decisions in favor of reviewability, see Dismuke v. U.S., 297 U.S. 167 (1936)
(in the absence of an explicit statutory command to deny review, courts will review); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944) (infringement of individual rights by unauthorized administrative
action).38Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970) (originally enacted by act of June
II, 1946, ch. 423, 60 Stat. 237.) [hereinafter the A.P.A.].
:"A.P.A.. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
10A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). However, § 706 permits courts to set aside agency action if found
to be "arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
41345 U.S. 229 (1953).
121d. at 232.
'"352 U.S. 180 (1956).
"Id. at 185. See Marcello v. Bonos, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955); Shaughnessy v. Penreire, 349 U.S.
48 (1955).
11A.P.A., § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971): Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Pre-Fabs Transit Co. v. U.S., 306 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
4"347 U.S. 260 (1954).
'
71d. at 268. See Service v. Dulles 354 U.S. 363 (1957), (regulations validly prescribed by a
governmental administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, and this principle holds
even when the administrative action under review is discretionary in nature).
4489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
111d. at 618.
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trine of judicial noninterference when the State Department has recognized and
allowed immunity."5 Although the court reached the correct decision in light
of the facts of this case, its opinion was unfortunately restrictive and could have
an adverse effect on attempts by other litigants to gain review of State Depart-
nient actions under the APA.
The court admitted that the State Department was subject to provisions of
the APA,5' but it refused to reach the merits of plaintiffs' argument that the
State Department had seemingly ignored its own standards as announced in
the Tate Letter.12 The court instead felt that the State Department's recognition
of immunity was a conclusive determination of the issue, precluding any further
judicial inquiry into immunity or argument on the issue of reviewability.53 In
effect, then, the court really never reached the question of whether a decision
by the State Department to grant sovereign immunity is reviewable under the
A PA.
The plaintiffs relied upon the APA as a vehicle to circumvent the long line
of precedents rubber-stamping the State Department's recognition of immun-
ity. There is much merit in the contention that, whatever the original justifica-
tion for the absolute theory of sovereign immunity,4 there is now substantial
authority for applying a restrictive concept of sovereign immunity.55 The courts
should not accept the State Department's suggestion of immunity without
question; rather, they should at least preliminarily examine the facts themselves
to see if there was some justification for granting immunity.
Through the Tate Letter the State Department itself has recognized a restric-




"Id. at 621, n.8. The letter announced that it would "hereafter be the department's policy to
follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign
governments for a grant as sovereign immunity." Letter of Acting Legal Advisor, Jack B. Tate,
to Department of Justice, 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 98986 (1952) [hereinafter the Tate Letter].
114 F.2d at 620: "Only if we permit an executive suggestion of immunity to preempt completely
judicial consideration of the question can we be certain that we are not encroaching upon the
executive's prerogative in foreign affairs."
4The doctrine originated in an era when kings theoretically could do no wrong and when the
exercise of authority by one sovereign over another indicated hostility or superiority. See Schooner
Exchange v. M'Fadden, II U.S. (17 Cranch). 116 (1812).
"The Tate Letter, at 984-6. See generally Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign
Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953); Dubrouir, A Gloss on the Tate Letter's Restrictive Theory
of Sovereign Immunity, 54 VA. L. REV. 1 (1968); Anticipating this development, Fensternalo,
Sovereign Immunity and the Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REv. 614 (1950). In Victory
Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit stated:
"Growing concern for individual rights and public morality coupled with the increasing entry of
governments into what had previously been regarded as private pursuits, has led a substantial
number of nations to abandon the absolute theory of sovereign immunity in favor of a restrictive
theory." Id. at 357. See SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1959); Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,
28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 220, 268 (1957).
[Vol. 4:2GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
or public acts (jure gestionis).6 Having limited its own discretion, the State
Department's actions can be reviewed using its own standards. As previously
noted, 7 the courts will determine questions of immunity using the State De-
partment's standards when the executive branch has not spoken on the issue.
Applying the distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis to
each case, the judiciary could thus determine whether the dispute involves a
sovereign or individuals. Even if a sovereign is involved, there is some basis for
arguing that when a state enters into a transaction with a private party, it ceases
to act as a sovereign, and this impliedly waives its immunity.58 Such waivers
should be considered by the courts, despite a suggestion of immunity by the
State Department. In applying the public-private acts distinction, the courts
will no longer be faced with the situation which confronted the Second Circuit
in !sbrandtsen Tankers v. President of India,59 where the cause of action was
held properly dismissed even though the conduct in question involved purely
private commercial activities.6 0 The court sympathized with the plaintiff but
concluded "we have no alternative but to accept the recommendation of the
State Department."" There is, however, no apparent reason why the courts
could not review the state department's recognition of immunity, under the
APA, when an issue of abuse of discretion is involved.
The reasoning of the court appears to be clearly erroneous; the presence of
the several caveats62 in the court's opinion would seem to indicate that the court
itself was unsure of its reasoning. Nonetheless, the result reached by the court
is undoubtedly correct. There could be valid reasons for the State Department
not adhering to its own standards announced in the Tate Letter. This raises the
possibility of political exceptions to the Tate Letter. 3 For instance, the Chi-
5
'The Tate Letter announced: "According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immun-
ity, a sovereign cannot, without his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of
the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not
with respect to private acts (jure gestionis), Tate Letter at 184.
517See note 19 supra.
5
"BRIERLy, THE LAW OF NATIONs 249 (6th ed. 1963). The distinction between public and private
acts of a sovereign was early noted in Bank of The United States v. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 904 (1824): "It is, we think, a sound principle that when a government becomes a partner
in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of
its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen." Id. at 906. This distinction was applied
to foreign sovereigns in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145 (1812).
A suit against a corporation is not a suit against a foreign sovereign. United States v. Deutsches
Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Coale v. Societe Co-operative Suisse Des
Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). A corporate defendant claiming sovereign immunity must
prove that it is a creature of the sovereign. Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam,
291 F. Supp. 49. (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971).
'"The commercial activity here involved was the sale of grain by the government of India.
"Id. at 1201.
I2Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d at 618, 621 & n.8.
"See Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864
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lean government unquestionably involved itself in the controversy-its planes
and navy were in hot pursuit of the Cuban vessel when it hastily left Valpariso
harbor with the unloading derricks still on board. The State Department may
have felt that the Chilean government by this political act so prejudiced the
claim of the plaintiffs that the United States should not get involved for politi-
cal reasons. Consider also the site of the attachment of the Cuban vessel.
Political questions directly affecting the United States and its relationship with
Panama possibly were involved. The treaty between the United States and
Panama concerning the control of the Panama Canal has been a source of
much controversy in recent years. The Panamanians claim a residuary sover-
eignty over the canal zone and have refused heretofore to recognize the right
of the United States to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over third countries'
ships in the Canal Zone. Perhaps the State Department did not wish to stir up
another controversy with the Panamanians and therefore granted immunity in
a situation where it would not ordinarily have done so under the Tate Letter
guidelines.
Finally, there may not have existed any inconsistency with the Tate Letter
guidelines at all. These allegedly private acts of the original parties involved
could have been done at the direction of their respective governments. In effect
they may have become public acts. However if this were so, it would have been
better for the court to have said so, rather than denying any power to review
State Department actions at all. This case involves important factual questions,
and it would have been much more preferable for the court to have dealt with
this case as a factual determination rather than speaking in broad terms about
sovereign immunity. A similar situation may never again arise, for the State
Department would assuredly refuse immunity if only private individuals were
involved. But if the State Department inadvertantly grants immunity where the
Tate Letter guidelines would apparently have denied it, a court faced with the
question of abuse of discretion will hopefully ignore this case and review the
State Department's action under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Robin B. Gray, Jr.
George P. Shingler
(1966), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized that the state department could
privately change or abandon its announced policy in the Tate Letter in its sole discretion in each
particular case. 215 A.2d at 874-77.
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